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Abstract Eavesdropping judgments (judgments about truth, retraction, and con-
sistency across contexts) about epistemic modals have been used in recent years to
argue for a radical thesis: that truth is assessment-relative. We argue that judgments
for ‘I think that p’ pattern in strikingly similar ways to judgments for ‘Might p’ and
‘Probably p’. We argue for this by replicating three major experiments involving the
latter and adding a condition with the form ‘I think that p’, showing that subjects
respond in the same way to ‘thinks’ as to modals. This poses a serious challenge
to relativist treatments of the modal judgments, since a relativist treatment of the
corresponding ‘thinks’ judgments is totally implausible, so if a unified account of
the phenomena is to be found, it cannot be a relativist one. We briefly sketch how a
unified account might look.
1 Introduction
Consider the following scenario, from MacFarlane 2011:
Might Boston: You overhear George and Sally talking in the coffee line.
Sally says, ‘Joe might be in Boston right now.’ You think to yourself: Joe
can’t be in Boston; I just saw him an hour ago here in Berkeley.
Here are some natural questions to ask about what Sally said. First, did she speak
falsely? Second, would it be appropriate for her to take back what she said? Third,
was your thought (that Joe can’t be in Boston) inconsistent with what Sally said?
In the recent literature, relativists have argued that the answers to questions like
these—questions that involve eavesdropping, or more generally, evaluation across
contexts—can be ‘yes’, and that this reveals something striking about truth: the truth
of claims like Sally’s depends on the assessor’s evidence, not the speaker’s evidence.
Such a position requires a radical readjustment in our thinking about truth: on this
way of thinking, the truth of sentences is not fixed by the context in which it is
asserted and the world where it is asserted; it also depends on the context where it is
* Thanks to Bob Beddor, Andy Egan, Justin Khoo, Josh Knobe, and Rose Lenehan for very helpful
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evaluated.1 Expressivists have used similar considerations to argue for a different,
equally radical conclusion—namely, that sentences like Sally’s are neither true nor
false at all, but rather serve only to express a certain state of mind.2
Contextualists, who hold that the context of assertion, together with the world
of evaluation, suffice to fix the truth-value of claims like Sally’s, have pushed back
against these revisionary claims, aiming to account for the judgments that have
motivated relativism and expressivism in the framework of classical contextualist
theories.3
In this paper we will argue that eavesdropping judgments—the patterns of
judgments about truth-value, retraction, and joint consistency that have motivated
this debate—in fact do not help us decide between these views at all. Our argument
is simple: cross-contextual judgments about constructions of the form pI think that
pq pattern in essentially the same ways as judgments about corresponding epistemic
modal claims of the form pMight pq or pProbably pq. Thus, whatever explanation
one gives of eavesdropping judgments about constructions involving pI think that
pq will most likely also account for the parallel patterns involving pMight pq or
pProbably pq. But, for reasons we will explain, it looks unlikely that the explanation
of the former will essentially involve relativist, expressivist, or, indeed, contextualist
resources; and so it looks unlikely that the judgments in the latter cases will involve
these resources either. Insofar as contextualism is the default view, this could be seen
as an argument for contextualism. But our central claim is not that contextualism
is correct, but rather that these particular judgments do not provide support for
relativism, expressivism, or contextualism.
To sketch our argument in a bit more detail, consider the following variant on
MacFarlane’s case, which substitutes ‘I think Joe is in Boston right now’ for ‘Joe
might be in Boston right now’:
Think Boston: You overhear George and Sally talking in the coffee line.
Sally says, ‘I think Joe is in Boston right now.’ You think to yourself: Joe
can’t be in Boston; I just saw him an hour ago here in Berkeley.
Now let’s ask the key eavesdropping questions about falsity, retraction, and consis-
tency as regards this variant. Did Sally speak falsely? Would it be appropriate for
her to take back what she said? Is what you thought to yourself inconsistent with
what Sally said? Our intuition is that it can be reasonable to answer ‘yes’ to these
questions, and, indeed, that this can be reasonable to just the same degree that it is
reasonable to answer ‘yes’ to the parallel questions in the ‘might’ variant.
1 E.g. Egan et al. 2005, Lasersohn 2009, Stephenson 2007a, Egan 2007, Kölbel 2009, Egan 2011,
MacFarlane 2014, Beddor & Egan 2018, Khoo & Phillips 2019.
2 E.g. Yalcin 2007, Swanson 2015, Moss 2015.
3 E.g. von Fintel & Gillies 2008, 2011, Dowell 2011, Khoo 2015.
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Suppose we are right about this; what would that show? One thing we might take
it to show is that ‘I think that Joe is in Boston’ is sensitive to the evidence the assessor
has in the context of assessment (on a relativist line), or is non-truth valued (an
expressivist line), or is sensitive to the salient information in the context of assertion
(a contextualist line), in an exactly parallel manner to the way in which ‘might’ or
‘probably’ is. But as far as we know, none of these views has been proposed in the
literature, and for good reason: none of these is a plausible theory of attitude reports.
While there may be features of context (of utterance or assessment) which influence
how we interpret attitude ascriptions, it does not seem plausible that the truth of a
report about what S believes will generally depend on what the assessor of the report
believes.
Another option would be to give two different explanations of our two phe-
nomena: one for the pattern of judgments about attitude ascriptions, and another
for the pattern of judgments about epistemic modal claims. But, as we will show,
these track each other so closely that this option looks ad hoc at best. It would be
much more theoretically parsimonious to offer a single explanation for the general
pattern. Such an explanation is unlikely to have much to do with epistemic modals
specifically, and if that’s right, then it isn’t going to turn in any interesting way on
relativist/contextualist/expressivist features of epistemic modals. A more plausible
explanation will instead account for both sets of patterns by way of general con-
siderations concerning the way we think about truth, retraction, disagreement, and
consistency.
Our main goal in this paper is simply to argue that the kind of evidence that
has played a central role in the literature probably is not helpful in distinguishing
between relativism, contextualism, and expressivism. Such a claim obviously does
not commit us to any one of these views being correct: it is compatible with our main
claims that any one of these is correct. However, insofar as these data have been more
critical for motivating relativism and expressivism, and insofar as contextualism is
often taken as a the default view, our points here may (but need not) be taken as
indirect support for a contextualist position.
Our plan is as follows. In the first three sections, we advance our claim that, with
regards judgments about truth/falsity, retraction, and consistency, epistemic modal
claims and ‘think’-reports pattern in similar ways. To argue for this, we look at the
three most significant empirical explorations of these judgments, namely those in
Knobe & Yalcin 2014, Beddor & Egan 2018, and Khoo & Phillips 2019. We choose
the most critical experiment from each of those papers and describe results of a
variant of that experiment which simply replaces the relevant epistemic modal claim
with a ‘think’-claim. In each case, we find that subjects’ judgments pattern the same
way in the ‘think’-variant as in the original epistemic modal variant. (Relativists
adduce similar evidence involving deontic modals, predicates of personal taste,
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knowledge, and so on; in this paper we will focus on epistemic modals, largely
because those judgments have been studied the most systematically.)
In the final section we do more to explain why we think that these judgments
should be explained in a uniform way; why we think that relativist/contextualist/expressivist
considerations probably play no part in a unified explanation; and how a unified
explanation might go.
2 Knobe & Yalcin 2014: Falsity and Retraction
The first, and simplest, experiment we discuss is from Knobe & Yalcin 2014. That
experiment aims to directly test judgments about falsity and retraction in a case like
the one with which we started (MacFarlane 2011). We selected the final experiment
in Knobe & Yalcin 2014 (Experiment 4) because this experiment tested judgments
of both retraction and falsity within a single experiment and involved a case which
has been prominent in the literature. Our only change to the original study was to
include new conditions in which the relevant epistemic modal claim is replaced with
an attitude report.
The original study found that participants were reluctant to judge an epistemic
modal claim as false in MacFarlane-inspired cases, though they did agree that
the claim should be retracted. We seek to both directly replicate this finding and
investigate whether it extends to otherwise similar attitude reports.
2.1 Methods
We collected a sample of 242 participants (Mage = 37.09; SDage = 11.3; 104 females)
from Amazon Mechanical Turk (www.mturk.com). Participants were randomly
assigned to one of four conditions, two of which were exact reproductions of the
conditions in Experiment 4 in Knobe & Yalcin 2014. As in Knobe & Yalcin 2014, all
participants read a version of the following scenario, which builds on MacFarlane’s
original case. The different versions varied only in what exactly Sally said. For
example, in the non-modal variant, Sally makes a non-modal claim about Joe’s
location:
Non-modal: Sally and George are talking about whether Joe is in Boston.
Sally carefully considers all the information she has available and concludes
that there is no way to know for sure. Sally says: “Joe is in Boston.”
Just then, George gets an email from Joe. The email says that Joe is in
Berkeley. So George says: “No, he isn’t in Boston. He is in Berkeley.”
In the Modal variant, Sally instead says “Joe might be in Boston”.
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Our addition was to add an Attitude variant in which Sally says “I think Joe is
in Boston.” No other changes were made to the original materials.
After reading one of these three variants, participants either answered a question
about whether it would be appropriate for Sally to retract what she said or answered
a question about whether what Sally said was false:
Retraction question: We want to know whether it would be appro-
priate for Sally to take back what she said (for example, by saying
“Ok, scratch that”). So please tell us whether you agree or disagree
with the following statement:
• It would be appropriate for Sally to take back what she said.
Falsity question: We want to know whether what Sally said is false.
So please tell us whether you agree or disagree with the following
statement:
• What Sally said was false.
In both cases, participants indicated their agreement on a scale from 1 (‘Completely
disagree’) to 7 (‘Completely agree’). Finally, all participants completed a brief
demographic questionnaire.
2.2 Results
Data and code for all of our experiments are available at [redacted for anonymous
review].
2.2.1 Replication
To statistically characterize the pattern of responses (see Fig.1), we first asked
whether we replicated the original finding in Knobe & Yalcin 2014.4 Similar to
Knobe & Yalcin (2014), we observed the critical interaction effect between question-
type (Retraction vs. Falsity) and statement-type (Non-modal vs. Modal), F(1,156) =
4 An overall analysis of variance revealed that participants’ agreement ratings were significantly
affected by whether the agent uttered a non-modal assertion, an epistemic modal claim, or an attitude
report, F = 68.2, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.17. We also observed a significant effect of whether participants
were asked about whether it would be appropriate for the agent to retract her claim or whether the
agent’s claim was false, F = 24.12, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.224. More importantly, we also observed an
interaction between these two variables, F = 14.87, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.112, meaning that the pattern
of participants’ judgments about the different claims differed depending on whether they were asked
the retraction or falsity question.
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Figure 1 Graph of participants’ agreement ratings that retraction would be appro-
priate (dark bars) or that the claim was false (light bars) as a function
of whether the utterance involved a bare assertion, an epistemic modal
claim, or an attitude report.
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34.64, p< .001, η2p = 0.182. This interaction was driven by the fact that we observed
no significant difference between judgments of falsity and retraction for non-modal
claims, t(66.38) =−1.62, p= 0.109, d = 0.363, but did observe a large difference
between falsity and retraction judgments for epistemic modal claims, t(64.99) =
−7.65, p< 0.001, d = 1.689.
2.2.2 Extension
We next asked whether the observed pattern for epistemic modal claims extended
to attitude reports. Indeed, we found a similar pattern: when the agent’s claim
involved an attitude report rather than an epistemic modal claim, participants were
more likely to judge that the agent should retract the claim than that the claim was
false t(66.91) =−4.00, p< 0.001, d = 0.883. Moreover, we found no significant
difference in participants’ agreement that retraction would be appropriate when the
the claim involved an epistemic modal or an attitude report, t(79) = 1.06, p= 0.291,
d = 0.236, and found that, if anything, participants more agreed with the falsity of
the claim when it involved an attitude report than when it involved an epistemic
modal, t(80) = −2.45, p = 0.016, d = 0.541. We return to this notable finding in
the general discussion.
In short, Knobe & Yalcin (2014) found that when the prejacent of an epistemic
modal claim turns out to be false, participants judge that the modal claim should
be retracted, but that participants are reluctant to say that it is clearly false (giving
only midpoint-level agreement). We found a similar pattern of judgments when the
epistemic modal claims were replaced with attitude reports.
3 Beddor & Egan 2018: Falsity and QUDs
The second experimental paradigm we explored probes judgments about truth and
falsity. In particular, Beddor & Egan (2018) argue that judgments about the truth-
value of epistemic modal claims depend on the question under discussion (QUD)
in the context of assessment. They take this as evidence for a particular kind of
relativism: one on which truth is relative to the assessors’ body of evidence and their
QUD.
Beddor and Egan argue for their claim on the basis of several structurally similar
experiments. We will focus on one particular experiment, Experiment 5, which we
think controls for some independent confounds in a helpful way which Beddor and
Egan discuss. (We come back to one these potential confounds, namely prejacent
targeting, in §5.) We replicate their experiment and add two new conditions in which
the relevant epistemic modal claims are replaced with attitude reports.
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3.1 Methods
We collected a sample of 500 participants (Mage = 38.33; SDage = 13.21; 240 fe-
males) from Amazon Mechanical Turk (www.mturk.com). Participants were ran-
domly assigned to one of four conditions, two of which directly replicated the
conditions of Experiment 5 in (Beddor & Egan 2018).
In Beddor and Egan’s original set-up, participants first read the following:
John is worried he might have strep throat. He goes to his primary care
physician and she runs an initial test that indicates that there is a 75% chance
that John does not have strep. Based on the initial test results, John’s doctor
says: “You probably don’t have strep throat. However, we should do a throat
culture in order to be safe. If it turns out that you have strep throat, we
should put you on antibiotics.”
The case went on as follows in two conditions that varied the QUD. In the QUD-
PREJACENT condition, the continuation focused on whether the prejacent is true—
i.e., on whether John has strep throat:
QUD-PREJACENT CONDITION:
John comes back two days later to find out the results of the throat culture,
and sees a different doctor. The throat culture comes up positive, which
indicates there is a 90% chance that John has strep throat. John has not
yet seen the results of these tests, but his new doctor has. John asks the
new doctor: “I’m trying to figure out whether I need to take antibiotics. My
primary care physician told me, ‘You probably don’t have strep.’ Is what
she said true?”
Which of the following responses would be correct?
(a) “No, it’s not”
(b) “Yes, it is”
In the QUD-COMPETENCE condition, the continuation focused instead on the
competence of John’s primary care physician:
QUD-COMPETENCE CONDITION:
John comes back two days later to find out the results of the throat culture,
and sees a different doctor. The throat culture comes up positive, which
indicates there is a 90% chance that John has strep throat. But now John
wants to know whether his primary care physician made a mistake admin-
istering the initial test, so he asks: “I’m trying to figure out whether I can
rely on my primary care physician. She told me, ‘You probably don’t have
strep’. Is what she said true?”
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The new doctor reviews the initial tests, and confirms that John’s primary
care physician had not made any mistakes interpreting the results. Given
this, which of the following responses would be correct?
(a) “No, it’s not”
(b) “Yes, it is”
In our variants, we simply replaced the doctor’s utterance, ‘You probably don’t
have strep throat’ with the utterance ‘I don’t think you have strep throat’. In other
words, participants in these two conditions first read the following preamble:
John is worried he might have strep throat. He goes to his primary care
physician and she runs an initial test that indicates that there is a 75% chance
that John does not have strep. Based on the initial test results, John’s doctor
says: “I don’t think you have strep throat. However, we should do a throat
culture in order to be safe. If it turns out that you have strep throat, we
should put you on antibiotics.”
Subjects then were randomly assigned to one of the two following conditions.
In the THINK / QUD-PREJACENT condition, the continuation again focused on
whether the sentence uttered is true:
THINK / QUD-PREJACENT CONDITION:
John comes back two days later to find out the results of the throat culture,
and sees a different doctor. The throat culture comes up positive, which
indicates there is a 90% chance that John has strep throat. John has not
yet seen the results of these tests, but his new doctor has. John asks the
new doctor: “I’m trying to figure out whether I need to take antibiotics. My
primary care physician told me, ‘I don’t think you have strep.’ Is what she
said true?”
Which of the following responses would be correct?
(a) “No, it’s not”
(b) “Yes, it is”
By contrast, in the THINK / QUD-COMPETENCE condition, the continuation
focused on the competence of John’s primary care physician:
THINK / QUD-COMPETENCE CONDITION:
John comes back two days later to find out the results of the throat culture,
and sees a different doctor. The throat culture comes up positive, which
indicates there is a 90% chance that John has strep throat. But now John
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wants to know whether his primary care physician made a mistake adminis-
tering the initial test, so he asks: “I’m trying to figure out whether I can rely
on my primary care physician. She told me, ‘I don’t think you have strep’.
Is what she said true?”
The new doctor reviews the initial tests, and confirms that John’s primary
care physician had not made any mistakes interpreting the results. Given
this, which of the following responses would be correct?
(a) “No, it’s not”
(b) “Yes, it is”
As in Beddor and Egan (2018), participants also completed a comprehension
check question. For the first two conditions, we used the same check as in Beddor
and Egan, namely: ‘In the scenario you just read, which of the following did John’s
primary care physician say?’ The options were ‘(a) You probably have strep. (b) You
probably don’t have strep. (c) You probably have pneumonia. (d) You probably don’t
have pneumonia’. In the other two conditions, we changed the comprehension check
question such that the options were: ‘(a) I think you have strep. (b) I don’t think you
have strep. (c) I think you have pneumonia. (d) I don’t think you have pneumonia.’
Lastly, all participants were asked to complete a brief demographic questionnaire.
No other changes were made to the original materials.
3.2 Results and analysis
We excluded the 27 participants who failed to answer the comprehension check
question correctly, and analyzed the responses from the remaining 473 participants.
3.2.1 Replication
Replicating the general pattern in Beddor & Egan 2018, we found that 83.05% of
participants in the QUD-PREJACENT condition selected ‘No, it’s not’, while only
28.81% of the participants in the QUD-COMPETENCE condition did.
3.2.2 Extension
More importantly, we found a strikingly similar pattern of responses when the
utterance was instead about the what the doctor believed. We found that 74.79%
of participants in the THINK / QUD-PREJACENT condition selected ‘No, it’s
not’, while only 27.12% of the participants in the THINK / QUD-COMPETENCE
condition did, a strikingly similar pattern to Beddor and Egan’s finding (Figure 2).
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Figure 2 Graph of the number of times each response option was selected as
a function of both whether or not the utterance involved an epistemic
modal and whether or not the assessment QUD targeted the doctor’s
competence.
Moreover, analyzing all of the data together using a generalized linear model, we
found only a main effect of the assessment QUD manipulation, z= 7.826, p< 0.001,
and no effect of whether the utterance involved an epistemic modal or an interaction
between them, p≥ 0.121.
In sum, Beddor and Egan (2018) found that the degree to which subjects agreed
with the ‘Yes’ versus ‘No’ responses varied with the QUD condition. In particular,
subjects were much more likely to judge ‘Yes’ in the COMPETENCE condition
(61%) than in the PREJACENT condition (27%). Beddor and Egan argued that this
tells in favor of a particular kind of QUD-sensitive relativism for epistemic modal
claims (this experiment focuses on ‘probably’ claims, while other experiments
focus instead on ‘might’ claims). We found the same pattern of QUD-relativity in
judgments for attitude reports.
4 Khoo & Phillips 2019: Consistency
The final paradigm we explore concerns judgments about consistency. Khoo &
Phillips (2019) investigate the degree to which subjects judge that at least one of
apparently conflicting epistemic modal claims, or judgments about epistemic modal
claims, must be false. Relativist and contextualist approaches differ at a structural
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level on their predictions for these questions. While the pattern found by Khoo and
Phillips is difficult to capture on either a standard relativist or standard contextualist
approach, we will not focus on this aspect of the data. Instead, our aim will be
simply to show that consistency judgments of apparently conflicting ‘think’-claims
(or assessments of a single ‘think’-claim) exhibit a pattern similar to what was found
by Khoo & Phillips (2019). We do this by replicating the experiment in (Khoo &
Phillips 2019) while adding analogous conditions involving ‘think’-claims.
4.1 Methods
In this experiment, 405 participants (Mage =37.99, SDage =12.47; 192 females) were
recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk (http://www.mturk.com). Participants
each completed a single trial, which involved reading a vignette about an ongoing
police investigation. In all cases, participants first read the following background
information:
The police are on the trail of Fat Tony, a local mobster. This morning, they
learn of a rumor that Fat Tony has died at the docks.
The Chief of the Police assigns Inspector A to examine the evidence at the
docks. Meanwhile, the District Attorney assigns Inspector B to review the
footage from the security camera at the docks.
How this background continued depended on the condition to which participants
were randomly assigned. Participants were assigned to either an Utterances or an
Assessments condition, and additionally to make assessments of either epistemic
Modal claim, a Non-Modal claim, or an Indexical claim.
In the Modal Utterances case, the background continued as follows:
Inspector A takes a good look at the evidence down by the docks, and
concludes that it suggests, but does not prove, that Fat Tony died at the
docks. The Chief calls Inspector A at the docks and asks him, “What have
you found?”
Inspector A replies, “Fat Tony could have died at the docks.”
Meanwhile, Inspector B reviews the security camera footage and concludes
that the footage proves that Fat Tony did die at the docks. The District
Attorney calls Inspector B and asks him, “What have you found?”
Inspector B replies, “Fat Tony couldn’t have died at the docks.”
By contrast, in the Modal Assessments case, the background instead continued:
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Inspector A takes a good look at the evidence down by the docks, and
concludes that it suggests, but does not prove, that Fat Tony died at the
docks. Afterwards, he goes home. That evening, Inspector A and his wife
watch the Chief of Police talking with reporters on TV. The reporters on the
news ask the Chief what his investigation had found.
The Chief tells the reporters: “Fat Tony could have died at the docks.”
Inspector A’s wife knows that Inspector A was examining the evidence at
the docks and so she asks him, “Is that right?”
Inspector A replies, “What the Chief said is true.”
Meanwhile, Inspector B reviews the security camera footage and concludes
that the footage proves that Fat Tony did not die at the docks. That evening
he watches the same TV broadcast with his wife, and they also hear the
Chief tell the reporters, “Fat Tony could have died at the docks.”
Inspector B’s wife knows that Inspector B was examining the evidence at
the docks and so she asks him, “Is that right?”
Inspector B replies, “What the Chief said is false.”
Two other conditions differed slightly from these. In one, participants instead
evaluated a Non-Modal claim. These cases were identical to the preceding ones
except that the Inspectors’/Chief’s claim(s) did not include the epistemic modal, and
thus instead read: “Fat Tony [died / did not die] at the docks.”
So far, this set-up exactly matches Khoo and Phillips’ set-up. Our addition was
an Attitude condition. These cases were identical to the preceding ones except that
the Inspectors’/Chief’s claim(s) took the form of an attitude report, and thus instead
read: “I [think / don’t think] Fat Tony died at the docks.”
Finally, other participants instead assessed Indexical statements, which were
also included in Khoo and Phillips’ experiment. In the Indexical Utterances case,
the background continued as follows:
Inspector A takes a good look at the evidence down by the docks, and
concludes that it suggests, but does not prove, that Fat Tony died at the
docks. Later that evening, Inspector A gets a call from the Chief. The Chief
knows that certificates of appreciation are being given to officers who have
served on the police force for at least twenty years, so he asks Inspector A,
“How long have you served on the police force?”
Inspector A replies, “I have served on the police force for twenty years.”
Meanwhile, Inspector B reviews the security camera footage and concludes
that the footage proves that Fat Tony did die at the docks. Later that evening,
Inspector B gets a call from the District Attorney. The District Attorney also
knows that certificates of appreciation are being given to officers who have
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served on the police force for at least twenty years, so he asks Inspector B,
“How long have you served on the police force?”
Inspector B replies, “I have not served on the police force for twenty
years.”
In the Indexical Assessments condition, the two inspectors instead made two
different claims about the truth of the Chief’s utterance:
Inspector A takes a good look at the evidence down by the docks, and
concludes that it suggests, but does not prove, that Fat Tony died at the
docks. Afterwards, he goes home. That evening, Inspector A and his wife
watch the Chief of Police talking with reporters on TV. The reporter on the
news knows that certificates of appreciation are being given to officers who
have served on the police force for at least twenty years, so she asks the
Chief, “How long have you served on the police force?”
The Chief tells the reporters: “I have served on the police force for
twenty years.”
Inspector A’s wife knows that Inspector A is on the police force, and so she
asks him, “Is that right?”
Inspector A replies, “What the Chief said is true.”
Meanwhile, Inspector B reviews the security camera footage and concludes
that the footage proves that Fat Tony did not die at the docks. That evening
he watches the same TV broadcast with his wife, and they also hear the
Chief say to the reporter, “I have served on the police force for twenty
years.”
Inspector B’s wife knows that Inspector B was also on the police force, and
so she asks him, “Is that right?”
Inspector B replies, “What the Chief said is false.”
After reading the entire vignette, participants were reminded that the inspectors
had made two different claims and were asked whether they agreed or disagreed
that “At least one of the inspectors’ claims must be false.” Participants rated their
agreement on a scale from 1 (“Completely Disagree”) to 7 (“Completely Agree”).
After answering this question, participants also answered a manipulation check
question. In the Modal, Non-Modal, and Attitude conditions, participants were
asked to make a judgment about what was more relevant in Inspector A’s conversation
and, then separately, in Inspector B’s conversation, which allowed us to test whether
they tracked the differences across these two conversational contexts. In both cases,
participants responded by selecting which of the following two options was more
relevant in each conversation:
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• What the evidence at the docks reveals about Fat Tony.
• What the security camera footage reveals about Fat Tony.
In the Indexical conditions, participants were instead separately asked who both
Inspector A and Inspector B think has served on the police force for twenty years.
They responded by selecting one of the following three options for each Inspector:
• Inspector A
• Inspector B
• The Chief
Finally, participants completed a brief and optional demographic questionnaire.
4.2 Results and analysis
No participants were excluded from the analyses. To ensure that participants correctly
understood the relevant differences in Inspector A’s and Inspector B’s contexts, we
first assessed participants’ judgments of which evidence was most relevant in the two
contexts. These judgments of relevance confirmed that participants clearly tracked
the changes in the different contexts: participants found the evidence at the docks to
be more relevant in Inspector A’s context, and found the evidence from the security
camera to be more relevant in Inspector B’s context, χ2(1) = 153.4, p < .001,
V = 0.5.
4.2.1 Replication
Following Khoo & Phillips (2019), we first analyzed participants’ judgments of
whether one of the Inspectors’ claims must be false in the Indexical condition. In the
Indexical Utterances condition, where Inspector A says, “I have served on the force
for more than twenty years,” and Inspector B says “I have not served on the force
for more than twenty years,” participants strongly disagreed that at least one of the
Inspectors claims must be false (M =3.42, SD=1.94). However, in the Indexical
Assessments condition, where the two Inspectors made conflicting assessments
about the Chief’s utterance of “I have served on the police force for twenty years,”
participants instead strongly agreed that at least one of the Inspectors claims must be
false (M =5.65, SD=1.68, t(94) =-6.02, p<.001, d =1.23).
Next, we analyzed participants’ compatibility judgments in the Modal and
Non-Modal conditions with a 2 (Statement: Bare vs. Modal) × 2 (Condition: Ut-
terances vs. Assessments) ANOVA. Replicating Khoo & Phillips (2019), partic-
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ipants’ judgments were significantly affected by whether or not the claims in-
volved a bare assertion or an epistemic modal claim, F(1,199) = 17.95, p< .001,
η2p = 0.083. More specifically, we found that participants more strongly agreed that
one of the inspectors’ claims must be false when they uttered/assessed a bare as-
sertion (M = 5.69,SD = 1.46), than when they uttered/assessed a modal claim
(M = 4.62,SD = 2.06), t(184.22) = −4.27, p < .001, d = 0.6. As in Khoo &
Phillips (2019), we also did not observe a significant effect of whether the In-
spectors made conflicting utterances or conflicting assessments, F(1,199) = 0.295,
p = .588, η2p = .001, and did not find an interaction effect between these two
variables, F(1,202) = 0.091, p = .764, η2p < 0.001, meaning that the difference
between the different claims (Bare vs. Modal) did not significantly differ between
the Assessments and Utterances conditions.
4.2.2 Extension
Finally, we asked whether the pattern we observed in the modal condition could
similarly be found in the attitude report condition. Specifically, we did a similar
analysis to that in Khoo & Phillips (2019), but replaced the modal condition with
the attitude condition. Once again, we found that participants’ judgments were
significantly affected by whether or not the claims involved a bare assertion or an
attitude report, F(1,202) = 4.772, p= .030, η2p = 0.023. Specifically, we found that
participants more strongly agreed that one of the inspectors’ claims must be false
when they uttered/assessed a bare assertion (M = 5.69,SD= 1.46), than when they
uttered/assessed an attitude report (M = 5.16,SD= 1.95, t(194.12) =−2.21, p=
.028, d= 0.31. We again did not observe a significant effect of whether the Inspectors
made conflicting utterances or conflicting assessments, F(1,202) = 0.052, p= .820,
η2p < .001, and did not find an interaction effect between these two variables,
F(2,202) = 0.213, p = .644, η2p = 0.001, meaning that the difference between
the different claims (Bare vs. Attitude) did not significantly differ between the
Assessments and Utterances conditions.
Finally, the Modal and Attitude conditions did not differ significantly from one
another, t(205.63) =−1.94, p= .054, d = 0.27.
In short, we replicated Khoo and Phillips’ key finding that speakers are less
likely to judge that at least one of the claims/judgments must be false in the Modal
cases than in the Bare cases. And, critically, we found that in the Attitude cases,
judgments patterned much the same way as in the Modal cases.
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Figure 3 Participants’ mean level of agreement that at least one of the inspectors’
claims must be false. Errors bars indicate +/- 1 SEM.
5 Discussion
5.1 What is eavesdropping good for?
These results together support our hypothesis that epistemic modal claims and ‘think’
claims pattern together when it comes to the eavesdropping phenomena that have
been at the heart of the debate between relativism, contextualism, and expressivism.
We think that this, in turn, suggests that these phenomena cannot play a central role
in deciding between these views. We lay out our argument for this conclusion in this
subsection.
One possible response to these results is to hold that there are simply two differ-
ent phenomena here: judgments about truth-value, retraction, and consistency for
epistemic modal claims, and judgments about truth-value, retraction, and consistency
for ‘think’ claims. If so, then we ought to pursue independent explanations for set
of phenomena. We can’t rule out a possibility like this, but from the point of view
of theoretical parsimony, it is obviously unattractive. Given the strikingly parallel
patterns we find across these domains, it strikes us as very unlikely that there are
two completely unrelated explanations that simply happen to generate very similar
patterns of results across this wide range of cases and questions.
So let us instead proceed under the assumption that the explanation of the
judgments in the two domains will be closely related. Given this assumption, what
kind of explanation would be plausible? Well, let’s think about what a relativist might
say here. Relativism about attitude ascriptions has in fact been defended with respect
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to ‘knows’ in MacFarlane 2014: it’s not unreasonable to think that sensitivity to
skeptical scenario-raising varies with the context of assessment rather than assertion.
And plausibly other kinds of context sensitivity that have been ascribed to attitude
claims—for instance sensitivity to Fregean guises, or to questions under discussion—
could be held to be provided by the context of assessment rather than the context of
assertion.
But none of this, as far as we can see, is any help in explaining the present
phenomena. Consider for example Knobe & Yalcin (2014)’s results and suppose we
want a relativist explanation of why subjects think that Sally should retract her claim
that ‘I think Joe is in Boston’, or why subjects are somewhat inclined to agree that
the claim is false. A relativist explanation which parallels the kind of explanation
given concerning epistemic modals would have to say that what matters in assessing
the truth of ‘I think Joe is in Boston’, as asserted by Sally, is not Sally’s attitude
state in the context of assertion, but rather the evaluating subject’s attitude state in
the context of assessment: the fact that we know in the later context that Joe is in
Boston would somehow have to suffice to make Sally’s earlier claim ‘I think Joe is
in Boston’ false, as assessed at the context of evaluation. But this idea has not been
defended in the literature, and it strikes us as totally implausible.
Let us say a little bit more about why this is. Let c be the context in which Sally
asserts ‘I think Joe is in Boston’ (for simplicity, think of c as a centered world).
Suppose that, in c, Sally is very confident that Joe is in Boston; she has all the
functional dispositions that are usually associated with a state of belief, including, of
course, the disposition to sincerely assert that she believes Joe is in Boston. Now
consider our context of assessment, where we know that Joe was not in Boston. Can
our knowledge somehow retroactively remove Sally’s belief that Joe was in Boston?
It is hard to see how it could.
To take another example, think about Beddor and Egan’s case, in which John’s
doctor says to John: ‘I don’t think that you have strep throat’ in his context s. If we
want to explain the QUD-relativity reported above by way of a relativist story, we
will have to say that the truth of the doctor’s claim in c depends on what information
we have in our context and what question we are attending to; and in particular,
that when we find out that John probably does have strep throat, this can on its own
suffice to falsify the doctor’s claim that he didn’t think John had strep throat. Again,
this seems plainly implausible. We can’t change facts about what the doctor thought
at some point in the past simply by finding out that it was false.
Our point here is not that relativism is in general implausible, nor even that
relativism about ‘think’ is implausible. Our point is rather that the particular form
of relativism that would be required to treat ‘think’ on an analogy with ‘might’ or
‘probably’ is grossly implausible. By contrast, the forms of relativism that have been
put forward about epistemic modals, predicates of taste, and so on seem prima facie
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much more plausible. To say that the truth of pMight pq or pThat’s tastyq depends
on our own information, or standards of assessment, seems like a possibility worth
exploration, in a way that the present hypothesis about ‘think’ just doesn’t: the
idea that the truth of pI think that pq, as asserted by S in some particular context
c, depends in general on whether we think that p is true strikes us as a hypothesis
that cannot be taken seriously. There may, again, be more subtle forms of relativism
about attitude claims that are more plausible—for instance, perhaps a relativist
might hold that Fregean guises can be provided by the context of assessment, or that
(as MacFarlane holds) what possibilities are made salient in assessing knowledge
ascriptions depends on the context of assessment. But the radical form of relativism
about ‘think’ that would be required to account for our data just does not seem
plausible and we think that it is for good reason that relativism along those lines has
never been defended.
The upshot of this is that if we want a unified explanation of cross-contextual
judgments which covers both epistemic modals and ‘think’ claims, it will not use
relativist resources to make sense of these judgments.
Similar considerations extend to expressivist approaches. Perhaps there are
subtle forms of expressivism that can be defended about ‘I think’. But what would
be needed to give a unified expressivist account of cross-contextual judgments about
‘think’ and ‘might’ or ‘probably’ doesn’t seem plausible. Such an account would
have to argue that there is no fact of the matter about whether Sally spoke truly when
she said ‘I think Joe is in Boston’. Rather, the idea would go, we should set aside
questions about truth and falsity, and should simply accept what she said if we think
Joe is in Boston, and reject it if we think he’s not. But this seems absurd. There is
a fact of the matter about whether what Sally said was true, and this fact depends
on whether Sally thought that Joe was in Boston. If we want to know whether Sally
spoke truly, we should inquire about her mental states, not ours.
What about contextualism? Well, contextualist approaches to epistemic modals
have generally tried to explain cross-contextual judgments by way of independently
motivated, general considerations about how people think about disagreement,
retraction, and so on (as in e.g. Khoo 2015). So contextualism is not usually proposed
as itself being an explanation of these phenomena. So while contextualism about
‘think’, as about epistemic modals, is reasonable enough, in our view, contextualism
does not advertise itself as on its own accounting for the phenomena in question;
and thus it is doubtful that contextualist resources on their own can account for the
relevant phenomena concerning ‘think’ and ‘might’.
In short, then, it looks like, if we want a unified account of cross-contextual
judgments involving ‘think’ and epistemic modals, that account will not essentially
involve the resources of relativism, expressivism, or contextualism, but rather will
come from independent considerations about cross-contextual judgments more gen-
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erally. To be clear, these general considerations are likely to be consistent with an
underlying theory of epistemic modals which is relativist, expressivist, or contextu-
alist; our claim is that none of these theories will on its own explain cross-contextual
judgments about the relevant phenomenon.
The dialectical situation here is somewhat delicate, so let us rehearse it briefly.
Our argument has been that cross-contextual judgments do not motivate relativism,
expressivism, or contextualism. While this claim, on its own, is neutral between
these theories, the dialectical situation concerning them differs in an important way:
namely, relativism and expressivism have been largely motivated by considerations
about cross-contextual judgments. If we are right that this motivation is undermined
by the data we have presented, then there will be correspondingly less motivation for
these theories in a general sense. Moreover, insofar as contextualism is the default
view that was complicated primarily by this kind of cross-contextual judgment, the
data we have presented could be taken as an argument for contextualism. However,
we don’t want to commit to this point: there could be independent sources of
motivation for relativism or expressivism. Our point is the more limited dialectical
one that cross-contextual judgments don’t on their own provide any evidence for or
against relativism, expressivism, or contextualism.5
5.2 A positive account
This is our central point, and it is a negative one. Still, a natural question to raise at
this point is how one should give a unified account of the cross-contextual judgments
concerning epistemic modals and attitude reports. Though our main goal is not to
answer this question, we want to say enough to suggest that an answer can be given.
This is important dialectically because if it turned out to be impossible to find a
satisfying unified account of these judgments, then a disjunctive strategy which deals
with modal judgments in one way and attitude judgments in a different way might
start to look more plausible.
What we want to say here is inspired both by earlier work on modal disagreement
in Khoo 2015, as well as the particular relativist proposal given in Beddor & Egan
2018. Although we have argued that Beddor and Egan’s QUD-relativism cannot be
plausible extended to ‘think’, and so is unlikely to be the correct account of modal
judgments either, the observation that cross-contextual judgments vary with the
QUD of assessment naturally suggests a different route, one rooted in the Gricean
5 Both relativism and expressivism have also been motivated on the basis of embedding data (for the
former, see Stephenson 2007b,a, Lasersohn 2009; for the latter, see Yalcin 2007). But contextualist
theories have been developed which account for most or all of these data (see in particular Ninan
2016, Mandelkern 2019), so it is not clear that there remains an embedding-based case for either
relativism or expressivism as compared with contextualism.
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perspective on conversation as a cooperative enterprise (Grice 1989) together with
a Stalnakerian perspective on conversation as a series of proposed updates to a
common ground (Stalnaker 1978).
To see our idea, start by recalling Beddor and Egan’s scenario. Think about
what statements like ‘You probably don’t have strep throat’ and ‘I don’t think that
you have strep throat’, as asserted by the doctor to John, do. Intuitively, these are
proposals to put little credence in the proposition that John has strep throat. If either
one is accepted, then the interlocutors will no longer spend much energy thinking
about possibilities in which John has strep throat. These intuitions can be made
precise in a variety of different ways. A helpful tool here is a Stalnakerian model of
conversation as a series of updates to a common ground: a record of the common
commitments of the conversants. Given this picture, an assertion of pI don’t think
pq will be very naturally taken as a proposal to rule out p,6 or at least to lend it little
credence, since the common ground aims to coordinate on the speakers’ beliefs.
Likewise, there are a variety of accounts of epistemic modals, in both contextualist
(Stalnaker 2014, Mandelkern 2018) and expressivist (Yalcin 2007, 2012, Swanson
2015) frameworks, on which an assertion of pProbably pq will have the effect of
ensuring that the conversants jointly assign little credence to p (plausibly relativist
frameworks could be developed in that direction as well).
Second, consider the proposal from Khoo 2015 about modal disagreements.
Khoo’s key idea is that disagreement can target the proposal made in the original
context, rather than the truth-value of what was said. So, for instance, even if it is
strictly true that the doctor thought that John had strep throat, her claim was not just
an articulation of this fact but also a proposal to make a certain kind of update to the
common ground—and one can disagree with the proposed update to the common
ground, even without thinking that the literal content communicated is false (as a
simple example of this kind of disagreement, Khoo considers the exchange ‘The
bank is open today.’ ‘No, the bank might be open today.’) Our proposal is to extend
Khoo’s idea to retrospective assessments in general, not just about agreement but
also about truth-value, retraction, and consistency. The idea is that subjects asked
for their intuitions about any of these can naturally focus on evaluating the proposal
which was made by the speech act in question, rather than on the asserted content
itself. In other words, subjects may interpret questions which are explicitly about
disagreement, retraction, truth, or consistency as being about the proposal in question
rather than about the asserted semantic content. The point is not that subjects are
completely unaware of the distinction between, say, considering a sentence to be
false and disagreeing with the update it proposes. Indeed, awareness (at some level)
of just that kind of distinction is presumably what accounts for Khoo’s finding that
6 At least on its most prominent, neg-raised reading.
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subjects in some conditions are more inclined to disagree with a sentence than to
judge it false, and likewise with Knobe and Yalcin’s finding, replicated above, that
subjects are more willing to retract a modal claim (and, likewise, an attitude claim)
than to judge it false. Nonetheless, we propose that subjects tend to move somewhat
freely between, say, a question about whether a claim was true and whether the
proposal it made was a good one.7 This is especially so in cases where, say, the
subject is asked explicitly about truth, but the questioner makes clear that what they
care about is a more general question, say, about the epistemic reliability of the
person who made the claim.
To make this more concrete, think about the cross-contextual evaluations that
Beddor and Egan report about ‘probably’, and the corresponding ones that we report
about ‘think’. These findings show that, when the salient question is whether John
has strep throat, subjects are much more likely to report that the doctor’s assertions
of ‘You probably don’t have strep throat’ and ‘I don’t think that you have strep
throat’ were false. When the salient question is instead whether the doctor is a
good doctor, they are much more likely to report these to be true. We think this is
naturally explained by way the idea that these responses can target the proposals
that these make, rather than their truth-conditions. These are, again, plausibly both
proposals to lend little credence to the proposition that John has strep. Well, were
these proposed updates good ones? It depends what features of the situation you
care about. Were they good with respect to moving us towards the facts of the matter
about John’s case? Clearly not. Were they good with respect to evidencing iatric
virtues? Clearly so. There are different respects in which a proposed update can be
a good one, and shifting focus from one of those respects to another can naturally
shift our retrospective judgments.
To see this point, consider a variant of this example, where John’s doctor has
very good evidence that John has condition X, treatable only by drug Y. The doctor
says: ‘Take Y’. The doctor did exactly the right thing given her evidence; but it turns
out that John’s tests for condition X were a very rare false positive, and he doesn’t
have X. Now consider the question: was the doctor’s prescription a good one? Well,
it depends on what sense of goodness we focus on: it was not good for John, insofar
as it was the wrong prescription; but it was evidence of good doctoring, insofar as it
was the best reaction to her evidence.
A virtue of the present proposal is that it also accounts for an intuitive contrast
between first- and third-personal attitude reports, pointed out to us by Bob Beddor
and Andy Egan (p.c.). Consider a variant on the present example, in which instead
of the doctor saying ‘I think you have strep throat’, a third party, Bob, says: ‘John’s
7 This proposal may have an underlying similarity to Kahneman and Tversky’s suggestion that ‘the
answer to a question can be biased by the availability of an answer to a cognate question–even when
the respondent is well aware of the distinction between them’ (Tversky & Kahneman 1983).
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mom thinks that John has strep throat’. Now suppose we find out that John doesn’t
have strep throat, and we are in a context where we are interested in the question of
whether John actually has strep throat. Intuitively, there is very little inclination to
say that what Bob said is false, unlike in the first-person case.
This is naturally accounted for on the present approach, since third-personal
belief reports plausibly have a very different update effect than first-personal ones.
Insofar as conversation aims to coordinate on the beliefs of the interlocutors, an
assertion of pI think that pq will standardly be taken to be a proposal to commonly
accept p; whereas an assertion of pS thinks that pq will not typically be taken
this way. (Of course, it could be taken this way, insofar as the interlocutors treat
S as a relevant authority; but it need not be.) And so we predict that retrospective
judgments about third-personal attitude reports will have a quite different profile
than retrospective judgments about first-personal attitude reports. This is a prediction
we hope will be borne out in future experimental work.
Similar points can be made about the other cases we explored above, and about
judgments about retraction and consistency as well as judgments about truth. Con-
sider the first result reported above—our variation on Knobe and Yalcin’s case—
where Sally says either ‘Joe might be in Boston’ or ‘I think Joe is in Boston’. Assume
that pMight pq is a proposal to make p compatible with the context—again, an idea
that has been spelled out in different ways in both contextualist and expressivist
frameworks. Then the first of these is a proposal to leave it open that Joe is in Boston;
the second a proposal to lend high credence to this proposition. Was Sally making a
good proposal in making these proposals? Well, in one sense, perhaps yes: insofar
as they conformed with her current evidence, they were perfectly good proposals.
From another, more objective, sense, they were bad proposals: since Joe wasn’t
in Boston, it was, in some objective sense, wrong to leave it open that he was in
Boston. Judgments about retraction, and perhaps to a lesser degree truth, might track
either one of these senses. One thing that speaks in favor of this account in this
particular case is that it explains the fact that subjects were even more likely to reject
the ‘think’ claims as false than they were to reject the ‘might’ claim as false. This
fits nicely with our account, since the former of these makes a stronger proposal than
the latter—namely, to lend high credence to the proposition that Joe is in Boston,
rather than simply to leave this open. So there is an obvious sense in which, from an
objective point of view, the first of these is a less good proposal than the latter, and
so more natural to reject.
Finally, the observed judgments about consistency fit naturally into this frame-
work. Recall that subjects are somewhat inclined (a bit above a midpoint) to judge
that p and pMight not pq are inconsistent, and likewise that p and pI think not pq are
inconsistent. This is naturally accounted for if what they are judging to be inconsis-
tent are sometimes the associated proposed updates: plausibly, one cannot update
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the same common ground with both members of either of these pairs. Judgments of
inconsistency were not as high as for non-modal claims, however, which is also what
we would expect if those judgments can also sometimes target plain old semantic
consistency, rather than update consistency (since p is semantically consistent with
pI think not pq, on any reasonable account, and likewise with pMight not pq, on
many reasonable accounts).
We want to emphasize that we are not saying much theoretically new here: our
account primarily generalizes existing insights from the literature. At the same time,
we think our results provide strong new evidence in favor of an account along the
lines we’ve proposed. This account—on which retrospective assessment can focus
on the proposal made, rather than the literal truth-value of what was said—gives
a unified explanation of both the modal data and the ‘think’ data. And it nicely
accounts for the QUD sensitivity that Beddor and Egan observe for ‘might’ and that
we replicate for ‘think’: changing what question we are currently concerned about
will naturally lead to changes in which aspect of the proposal we are judging, and so
to changes in retrospective judgment. Given the matching ‘think’ data, we think that
the current proposal is a far more plausible one of the epistemic modal data than one
that makes central use of relativist or expressivist resources. 8
6 Conclusion
What is eavesdropping good for? Our main point in this paper has been negative:
eavesdropping isn’t good for much in deciding between different theories of epis-
temic modals—and hence different theories of truth. Our argument has been the
following. We find the same patterns of cross-contextual judgments for claims with
the form pI think pq as for claims of the form pMight pq and pProbably pq. Relativist
and expressivist views have been proposed to account for the latter kinds of claims.
8 A different kind of approach would develop a suggestion from von Fintel & Gillies 2008: that
retrospective judgments can sometimes target the prejacent of a modal claim, rather than the claim as
a whole. Extending this proposal to ‘think’ is straightforward. However, we think the QUD-sensitivity
we observe in the latter case speaks strongly against this approach. On this approach, what would
explain our tendency to judge ‘I think you have strep throat’ false when we are concerned with
whether John has strep throat would be a tendency, in this case, to target the prejacent (‘You have
strep throat’) rather than the sentence as a whole. But what would explain our tendency to judge the
sentence true when we are concerned with whether the doctor is good? On a prejacent-targeting story,
we would say that, in the latter case, we tend more to take the whole sentence into consideration,
rather than just its prejacent. But this doesn’t make much sense when we want to know whether John’s
doctor is good: after all, being a good self-reporter of beliefs isn’t very good evidence that one is a
good doctor. This approach would also not, as far as we can tell, make sense of the contrast between
first- and third-personal reports noted above. So we think something more needs to be said here: a
prejacent-targeting story may well be part of the picture, but we doubt that, once QUD sensitivity is
taken into account, it can account for the bulk of the judgments reported above.
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But what the relativist or expressivist would have to say to account for the attitude
report cases in a parallel fashion are just not plausible. Moreover, as we have argued,
we do want a unified account: the patterns we find across the three experiments
reported here are too similar for a disjunctive strategy to appear attractive. So it does
not look like a relativist or expressivist account is promising.
We have combined this negative point with a sketch of a positive account,
building on existing proposals in the literature, in particular that of Khoo 2015, on
which cross-contextual judgments are often based on the appropriateness of the
proposal that has been made, rather than the literal truth-value of what was said. We
have argued that this provides a promising account of both the modal data and the
‘think’ data, and that its plausibility is further augmented by the QUD-sensitivity that
we observe for both. We should emphasize that our positive proposal is separable
from our central negative point, and that one could try to develop a different unified
account of the phenomena. It is, however, important for our negative point that there
exists a unified positive account; if there were not one, then a disjunctive approach
would look much more plausible, and our negative point would be undermined. We
hope to have said enough to show that there is indeed good reason to think that a
unified positive account can be had.
Our particular positive proposal is consistent with a variety of different underly-
ing theories of epistemic modals, including contextualist, expressivist, and relativist
ones—provided they account for the characteristic update effects of modal claims.
And so our negative point should not be interpreted as an anti-relativist or anti-
expressivist argument on its own. But, as we have noted, relativism and expressivism
have often been centrally motivated on the basis of cross-contextual judgments; and
our central claim has been that cross-contextual judgments do not motivate relativism
and expressivism. So, insofar as we see contextualism as a default position that we
have only departed from because of these puzzling cross-contextual judgments, our
negative point may specifically put argumentative pressure on the motivation for
relativism or expressivism.
Let us close by noting that our positive proposal is very much in line with a
broadly Gricean perspective on conversation. Grice’s work emphasized that speakers
tend to be cooperative, even when this entails being non-literal in a variety of ways.
Beddor and Egan’s results, and our corresponding development of them, show that
eavesdropping judgments are very sensitive to the conversation’s QUD, and thus
to the manifest goals of the conversation. This, in turn, suggests that judgments in
this area constitute just one instance of this general phenomenon, in which speakers
who are asked about truth may respond in a slightly non-literal, but manifestly more
helpful, way; corresponding caution is therefore needed before we interpret those
responses as telling us anything directly about truth.
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